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Inheritance taxes may induce heirs to discontinue family firms. Because firm dissolution 
incurs transaction costs, a preferential tax treatment of transferred family businesses seems to 
be desirable from a macroeconomic viewpoint. The support of dynastic succession, however, 
entails also a cost on the economy if firm continuation by less able heirs prevents entry into 
entrepreneurship. Here, we investigate analytically and quantitatively the trade-off between 
transaction costs saved and creative destruction prevented. We find that a unique general 
equilibrium exists at which, depending on the institutional setup, low-ability heirs either 
abandon (Type 1) or continue (Type 2) a family business. A calibration of the model with 
German data suggests that preferential tax treatment of family firms has severe negative 
consequences on macroeconomic performance if it causes a threshold crossing from Type 1 to 
Type 2 equilibrium. It also reveals that the targeted persons, i.e. the entrepreneurs that are 
caused to continue a business, always lose relative to their status in an economy without 
continuation-friendly tax policy. 
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February 2008 1. Introduction
Inheritance taxation or, according to the U.S. American dictum, estate taxation is under
steady debate in many industrialized countries. On the one hand, proponents argue that taxing
inheritances is an eﬀective mean to “level the playing ﬁeld”, i.e. to mitigate wealth inequality
and improve equality of opportunity. On the other hand, supporters of tax reduction or repeal
argue that it provides disincentives to accumulate capital and retards work eﬀort.1
Here we focus on one point that is always stressed in the inheritance tax debate, namely
that taxes on inherited family ﬁrms impose a burden on the heirs that may induce them to
discontinue the business. Business closures and the start up of new ﬁrms entail transaction
costs, i.e. real eﬃciency losses without any gains elsewhere in the economy. It has been argued
that, therefore, continuation of family ﬁrms is desirable from a macroeconomic viewpoint and
should not be punished by the tax law.2
In many industrialized countries the tax law treats inherited ﬁrms preferentially or reforms
in this direction are planned for the future. Already in 1994 the European Commission (1994)
published its recommendations on the transfer of small and medium size enterprises where
it reads “We want to encourage the Member States to adopt concrete and speciﬁc measures
to prevent SME closures, which have an adverse eﬀect on attempts to maintain and increase
employment. [...] The Commission requests the Member States to ensure that family law,
inheritance law and the payment of ﬁnancial compensation cannot jeopardize the survival of
the business [and to] reduce taxation on assets in the event of transfer by succession or by gift,
provided that the heirs continue to operate the business.” In 2006 the European Commission
(2006) reviewed the implementation of its recommendations and concluded that 21 out of 25
states had either implemented the recommendation of reduced inheritance taxation or were
planning an implementation for the future.
The high importance attributed to inheritance taxation of family ﬁrms stems from the recog-
1These issues are discussed by, among many others, Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994), Weil (1994), Holtz-Eakin (1999),
Kopczuk and Slemrod (2001), Gale and Perozek (2001) Holtz-Eakin and Marples (2001), and in a general equi-
librium context by Laitner (2001) and Cagetti and de Nardi (2007). Gale and Slemrod (2001) provide a short
survey over “rhetoric and economics in the estate tax debate” In a recent normative approach Farhi and Werning
(2007) ﬁnd that the optimal inheritance tax is progressive if future generations are directly valued in welfare
maximization.
2This reasoning is somehow weakened by the fact that the current owner could (and in many cases does) take
care of expected inheritance tax payments through life insurance so that there is no sudden liquidity constraint
to bear for oﬀsprings when they take over the business and face the tax burden. But the general argument that
inheritances taxes may prevent ﬁrm continuation and cause transaction costs remains, of course, valid.
1nition that this institution is a quantitatively important determinant of employment, income per
capita, and many other macroeconomic aggregates. In Germany, for example, about 85 percent
of all ﬁrms in the manufacturing sector are family-owned and managed (BDI, 2006). The small
and medium enterprises (SMEs) of the so called German “Mittelstand”encompasses 99 percent
of all German companies and employs about 70 percent of the labor force. Many European
countries (but not the U.S.) show similar characteristics. 99 percent of the European enterprises
are SMEs. The average European SME employs 6 people and 66% of the European labor force
are employed in SMEs (See European Commission, 2003, and Deutsche Bank, 2007.)
The business continuation argument shifts the discussion from the general pros and cons
of inheritance taxation towards the speciﬁc tax treatment of one particular item, the family
ﬁrm. Strictly speaking, the continuation argument cannot be used in order to generally justify
inheritance tax cuts or the preferential tax treatment of inherited businesses. Instead, tax
alleviation should be contingent on an action of the heirs, namely to continue the inherited
ﬁrm. With respect to family ﬁrm friendliness we can thus diﬀerentiate between three possible
tax schemes, equal treatment of all inherited wealth, preferential treatment of family ﬁrms, and
preferential treatment of family ﬁrms contingent on their continuation.
A discussion of the three possible tax schemes is epitomized almost ideally by the current de-
bate on inheritance taxes among legislature, jurisdiction, and business associations in Germany.
According to the current law, real estates and businesses – irrespective of their continuation –
receive a preferential treatment vis-` a-vis other forms of bequests. Because this procedure does
not conform to the principle of equality the Federal Constitutional Court has ruled against it.
This implies that the current tax system operates at most until 2009. If there is no tax reform
until then, family ﬁrms will be treated like other bequests. Yet, the Bundestag has just (in
December 2007) launched a tax reform that simultaneously abolishes the general preferential
treatment of family ﬁrms and establishes major tax alleviation for businesses that are continued
for at least 15 years by the heirs.
Preferential tax treatment of continued family ﬁrms, however, may also incur a cost on society.
While the founder of a family business is almost by deﬁnition endowed with high entrepreneurial
skills this is not necessarily true for his or her heirs. Unlike ﬁnancial wealth, management
skills cannot be inherited perfectly. Given a possibly small but inevitably positive probability
that heirs do not inherit the entrepreneurial spirit and the management skills of their parents,
2management abilities, like other personal characteristics, regress towards the mean (Galton,
1877, Mulligan, 1999). On average and over the long-run, heirs of family ﬁrms will have just
average skills to run the business and probably underperform vis-` a-vis new entrants who are –
by self selection into entrepreneurship – more likely to be endowed with high entrepreneurial
skills.
While there are also good reasons to believe that heirs of family ﬁrms are endowed with
particular management traits (tacit ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge and longer planning horizons, for
example), the recent empirical evidence suggests that the negative regression-to-the-mean eﬀect
dominates. Comparing publicly traded businesses it has been found that heir-controlled ﬁrms
underperform relative to those managed by unrelated CEOs. This is shown by Morck et al.
(1998), Perez-Gonzalez (2006), Villalonga and Amit (2006), Bloom and van Reenen (2007), and
Bennedsen et al. (2007) for US American, British, Canadian, Danish, French, and German ﬁrms.
A continuation-friendly tax policy that causes low-ability heirs to continue a family business
has direct and indirect repercussion on the macroeconomy. If managing ability complements
factor input, which seems to be a natural characteristic of managing qualities, low-ability heirs
invest less and employ less workers than their high-ability counterparts. In short, they run
ineﬃciently small businesses. A second, indirect eﬀect on eﬃciency occurs if the presence of
low-ability descendants of ﬁrm owners blocks entry into entrepreneurship of high-ability descen-
dants of workers. In this case, a continuation-friendly tax policy reduces aggregate total factor
productivity (TFP) and through this channel probably not only current GDP per capita but
also economic growth. It slows down the Schumpeterian process of creative destruction. Finally,
ﬁrm continuation may have a negative “third generation” eﬀect on welfare that occurs when
low-ability heirs invest little or nothing, live oﬀ the capital stock of the inherited ﬁrm instead,
and transfer small wealth to their own oﬀspring.
It is our impression that these negative repercussions of ﬁrm continuation are largely over-
looked in the inheritance tax debate. This does, of course, not necessarily imply that fostering
ﬁrm continuation is a bad idea. Firm continuation may still be worthwhile because of the saved
transaction costs through prevented exit and entry. A trade-oﬀ exists and the question is which
eﬀect dominates. The purpose of the present paper is thus to investigate whether lower inheri-
tance taxes for family ﬁrms are eﬃciency-enhancing or whether they are reﬂecting family values,
which are harmful for aggregate economic performance and welfare.
3In order to solve this problem we propose a simple general equilibrium model with endogenous
exit and entry of heterogeneous family-owned ﬁrms and inheritance taxation. We model the
decision of descendants of ﬁrm owners whether to operate the inherited ﬁrm or to sell it and
become a worker. Descendants of workers decide whether to become entrepreneur or worker.
Entrepreneurs choose the amount of investment and bequeath the ﬁrm to their oﬀspring. With
this dynastic business transfer we intend to capture the revealed preferences of many ﬁrm owners,
i.e. the desire to ensure survival and family control of their ﬁrm. Workers, by contrast, choose
the amount of their bequests through foregone life-time consumption. The fact that individuals
diﬀer by provenance, i.e. origin from worker- or entrepreneur-households, by inherited wealth,
and by entrepreneurial talent drives the heterogeneity of ﬁrms and the performance of the
macroeconomy.
In the analytical part of the paper we show that there exists a unique general equilibrium of
the model economy, which assumes one of two possible types. In a Type 1 equilibrium low-ability
heirs of family ﬁrms sell the business and exit the market immediately, in a Type 2 equilibrium
low-ability heirs continue the business unless they have inherited it from a parent who was also
of low ability. We show how the threshold separating Type 1 from Type 2 depends, among other
things, on inheritance tax arrangements and we investigate performance of the economy at the
two types of equilibria.
We then continue by calibrating the model with German data and investigate numerically how
alternative, currently debated inheritance tax reforms aﬀect the performance of the economy
with respect to income per capita, TFP and other economic indicators. We also show the impact
of the proposed reforms on utility of the diﬀerent groups in society and on aggregate welfare.
Our model shares some elements with Caselli and Gennaioli (2006) who also investigate ﬁrms
where ownership and control are passed from one generation to the other. They show that
dynastic management reduces total factor productivity if the heirs have little talent and use this
result to explain cross-country diﬀerences in TFP. The incidence of family ﬁrms is explained by
weak institutions and underdeveloped ﬁnancial markets. As a result, family ﬁrms are predicted
to be more prevalent in less developed countries from which the diﬀerence in TFP across countries
derives. With contrast, we investigate family ﬁrms in fully industrialized countries with strong
institutions and developed ﬁnancial markets. Family values motivate entrepreneurs to pass on
their ﬁrm to their oﬀspring and the interaction of tax legislation, transactions cost, and wealth
4inequality determines whether the heirs continue the business.3
2. The Model
2.1. The Population. We consider an economy populated by a unit mass of families, indexed
by i ∈ [0,1]. Families are intergenerationally linked and conceptualized as dynasties whereby we
assume for simplicity that each parent generation has one child. In each period t = 0,1,2,... there
is one generation of each dynasty economically active, either as a worker or as an entrepreneur.
The number of entrepreneurs (nt) and the number of workers (1−nt) in the economy is generally
endogenous and predetermined only for the initial period.
From period one onwards economic agents have to make a career decision depending on kind
and magnitude of their inherited wealth and their endowment with entrepreneurial skills (in
short “ability”). Speciﬁcally, we assume that the ability to manage a ﬁrm is either high or
low, i.e. ability of the member of family i who is economically active in period t is given by
at(i) ∈ {aL,aH}, aL < aH. Like wealth, managerial ability may be inherited. Although the
recent empirical literature provides little support for an intergenerational transfer of talent (see
the Introduction) it is nevertheless useful to control for this possibility. This way, the model takes
into account that family ﬁrms may be transferred together with the ability to manage them,
an argument that could be put forward by supporters of inheritance tax relief. Inheritance of
ability does not necessarily have to be conceptualized as the transmission of a “manager-gene”.
It may also include the transfer of tacit management knowledge within the family. In modelling
ability inheritance we follow Caselli and Gennaioli (2006). Speciﬁcally, we assume that there
is a fraction λ of high-ability individuals in the population and that the correlation coeﬃcient
of parent’s and children’s ability is given by µ, 0 ≤ µ < 1. A stationary distribution of ability
requires then that the probability to inherit one’s parent high ability is pH = λ+µ−λµ whereas
the probability to inherit low ability is pL = 1 − λ + λµ.
2.2. Dynasties. Dynasties are linked through intentional transfers of wealth. A family member
i of generation t has preferences over consumption ct(i) and the net amount bequeathed to the
3Caselli and Gennaioli investigate a much richer wealth distribution than the present paper. Since our main
arguments are based on eﬃciency considerations we impose a very stylized distribution of wealth in order to
obtain our main results analytically hoping that distributional issues are of second order for eﬃciency outcomes.
How bequests aﬀect the wealth distribution is an interesting aspect in itself which is addressed by Laitner (2001),
Heer (2001), Cagetti and de Nardi (2006, 2007), and Bossmann, Kleiber and W¨ alde (2007). The link between
entrepreneurship, savings, and wealth distribution is also investigated by Quadrini (1999) and Gentry and Hubbard
(2004).
5oﬀspring, reﬂecting a “joy-of-giving” bequest motive (Andreoni, 1989). Taking an inheritance
tax at rate τ into account the net bequest bnet
t enters a quasi-linear utility function together
with consumption.
Ut(i) = ct(i) + v(bnet
t (i)), (1)
where v0 > 0, v00 < 0. The elasticity of marginal utility from bequests is constant and denoted
by η ∈ (0,1]. Quasi-linearity of the utility function allows us to solve the model analytically
and to work out important mechanisms. The form of bequests is conditional on occupation.
For workers, bequests consist of foregone life-time consumption whereas for entrepreneurs they
consist of the capital stock of their ﬁrm. Thus, the prospect that the ﬁrm remains in the
ownership of the family serves as a second motive (besides making proﬁts) for investment of
entrepreneurs.4
Given that capital depreciates at rate δ ∈ [0,1), an entrepreneur i in t bequeaths an amount
(1−δ)kt(i) of the capital stock. We assume that heirs do not assign a particular non-pecuniary
value to family ﬁrms implying that they sell an inherited ﬁrm whenever this appears to be
ﬁnancially worthwhile. Depending on provenance and occupation individuals in our model-
society can be classiﬁed into four types:
• heirs of entrepreneurs who continue a family business
• heirs of entrepreneurs who sell an inherited ﬁrm and become workers
• heirs of workers who start up a new enterprise
• heirs of workers who continue to be workers.
In principle, each type can be assumed by high and low-ability individuals but talented heirs
(endowed with ability aH) have an advantage in continuing a family ﬁrm vs. untalented heirs
and talented oﬀspring of workers have an advantage in establishing a new enterprise vs. their
untalented counterparts.
2.3. Investment and Firm Sale. If a member of dynasty i inherits a ﬁrm and remains en-
trepreneur, he decides upon how much to invest into that ﬁrm. When he invests zt(i) the capital
input is given by
kt(i) = (1 − δ)kt−1(i) + zt(i). (2)
4The view that the incidence of family ﬁrms originates from family values is supported by the evidence compiled
in Bertrand and Schoar (2006).
6If he prefers to give up the inherited ﬁrm, the capital stock (1 − δ)kt−1(i) is sold to the world
market at a price q ∈ (0,1] per unit of capital. The price q may be smaller than one because
capital is attached to the speciﬁc environment of the ﬁrm and is less valuable for an outside
buyer than within the particular ﬁrm. Alternatively, one may think of costs to deinstall capital
and install it elsewhere. In general, q is an inverse measure of transaction costs associated with
the sale of a ﬁrm, i.e., a low value of q indicates large transaction costs per unit of capital.
Because transaction costs are modelled as an extra deprivation of capital through sale, they
imply foregone output and impose a real eﬃciency loss on the economy, a loss that would not
occur if the ﬁrm were continued.
In order to limit case diﬀerentiation we do not discuss the possibility that untalented heirs
transfer control to hired talented managers. Although the involved agency problem is interesting
in its own right (see Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer, 2003), we are conﬁdent that it would not
alter any of our major results as long as the “low-ability” of heirs extends from management to
supervision. Empirically, a large fraction of the small and medium-size enterprises we have in
mind are indeed family owned and managed, in Germany’s manufacturing sector, for example,
about 85 percent of all ﬁrms (BDI, 2006). Of these, 90 percent are 100 percent family-owned.
If a descendant of a worker decides to become entrepreneur, he has to incur a ﬁxed cost ¯ k > 0
so that after investing zt(i) the amount of capital employed in the production process of a newly
founded ﬁrm i in t is given by
kt(i) = zt(i) − ¯ k. (3)
Here the parameter ¯ k stands as a catch all for startup costs as well as costs stemming from liquid-
ity constraints experienced by entrants because they cannot use an inherited ﬁrm as collateral.
Fonseca, Michaud and Sopraseuth (2007), show that indices for startup costs and liquidity con-
straints are usually positively correlated across West European countries.
Investments are made in the beginning of the period. We consider a small open economy in an
environment with developed ﬁnancial markets and internationally mobile capital. Simplifying
we assume that there are no borrowing costs besides ¯ k and that the desired capital stock can
be ﬁnanced at an internationally given interest rate, which is set to zero.5 Because our article
is an investigation of the continuation problem of family ﬁrms and not of international tax
competition, we exclude the possibility of tax avoidance through ﬁrm relocation. For that
5Assuming a zero interest rate is inconsequential for our results and saves notation.
7purpose we assume that owners of family ﬁrms who consider to escape inheritance taxation
have to move their residence along with their ﬁrm (in order to supervise production) and that
mobility costs, which may involve mental and social costs of moving abroad, are suﬃciently high
so that entrepreneurs prefer to stay at home.
2.4. Production. Output produced by an entrepreneur of family i in period t is determined
by a Cobb-Douglass production function
yt(i) = at(i)lt(i)αkt(i)1−α, (4)
0 < α < 1, where lt(i) is labor input and kt(i) is capital input. Ability of entrepreneurs
complements capital and labor inputs and operates like a measure of total factor productivity.
An entrepreneur of high ability (at(i) = aH) produces more output for a given combination of
inputs than a less able one.
Workers supply one unit of labor of identical quality to a perfect labor market and receive a
wage wt. Entrepreneurs are the residual claimants to income net of wage payments. Firms are
price-takers and output prices are normalized to one. Thus earnings of an entrepreneur i are
given by
πt(i) = at(i)lt(i)αkt(i)1−α − wtlt(i). (5)
2.5. Government. The government levies proportional taxes on inheritances and redistributes
the revenue in form of lump-sum transfers Tt. The government budget is balanced in each time
period. In order to investigate our main policy problem we allow the taxes to depend on the
type of asset inherited. The tax rate is
• τk ∈ [0,1) for descendants of ﬁrm owners who continue the family business.
• τs ∈ [0,1) for descendants of ﬁrm owners who sell the family ﬁrm, τs ≥ τk.
• τb ∈ [0,1) for descendants of workers.
Let bt(i) denote the bequest of an individual i in t. Depending on the relevant tax rate,
τ ∈ {τk,τs,τb}, the after-tax bequest is given by
bnet
t (i) = (1 − τ)bt(i). (6)
In many countries, at ﬁrst glance, the tax law suggests τk = τs = τb. However, the eﬀective
tax rate applied to the capital stock of an inherited ﬁrm depends on institutional depreciation
8rules. If the tax treatment allows faster depreciation than the one physically taking place (i.e.,
the tax law allows the book value of the capital of a ﬁrm to depreciate at a higher rate than δ),
then in eﬀect τk < τb. An eﬀectively lower τk follows also from the deferral of tax payments for
inherited family businesses which is permissable in many European countries and in the U.S.
The legislator’s underlying motivation for establishing a preferential tax treatment of inherited
business capital is possibly not to privilege the heirs of ﬁrm owners but to foster ﬁrm continuation
by alleviating the succession problem. Thus, a more sensible, ﬁne-tuned tax policy consists of a
preferential treatment of inherited family ﬁrms contingent on the continuation of the business. In
some countries such a policy is already in place and in many others movements in this direction
are high on the policy agenda. This motivates our assumption of a third tax rate τs that applies
when an inherited ﬁrm is sold, τs ≥ τk.
Arguments in favor of such tax relief for continued family businesses are captured by two
elements in our model. Continued ﬁrms entail no startup costs ¯ k and the value of capital is
not diminished in a process of ﬁrm dissolution (no sale of capital at price q < 1). Because
the continuation of family ﬁrms prevents these agency- and transaction costs, i.e. real eﬃciency
losses of the economy, it may be desirable from a macroeconomic viewpoint and a preferential
tax treatment seems to be worthwhile. However there is also an eﬃciency argument speaking
against tax allowances for continued ﬁrms.6
The trade oﬀ occurs because ability is transferred imperfectly between generations (µ < 1).
Motivated by a preferential tax treatment some less able heirs may be inclined to continue a
family business. As explained above, managers of low ability make inferior use of factor inputs
and reduce eﬃciency of the economy. The negative eﬀect is ampliﬁed further if the presence
of less able heir-managers blocks entry of highly able descendants of workers. In that case
the survival of low-ability ﬁrm owners reduces the number of active high-ability entrepreneurs.
In other words, a preferential tax treatment of family ﬁrms may slow down the Schumpeterian
process of creative destruction. The investigation of the trade oﬀ between transaction costs saved
and creative destruction prevented is at the center of the following discussion of the eﬀects and
desirability of alternative inheritance tax schemes.
6Our discussion focusses on eﬃciency arguments and largely neglects distributional issues.
93. Career Choices
3.1. Entrepreneurs. Consider a member of family i with ability at(i) inheriting a ﬁrm with
(1 − δ)kt−1(i) units of capital (being equal to the tax base) who continues the family business
and invests zt(i). His consumption is given by ct(i) = πt(i)−zt(i)−τk(1−δ)kt−1(i)+Tt. When
he retires or dies he leaves an amount (1−δ)kt(i) of productive capital in the family ﬁrm, which
he bequeaths to his oﬀspring. Inserting (2) and (5) into consumption, we see that utility (1) is
maximized subject to
ct(i) = at(i)lt(i)αkt(i)1−α + (1 − τk)(1 − δ)kt−1(i) + Tt − wtlt(i) − kt(i), (7)
bnet
t (i) = (1 − τk)(1 − δ)kt(i), (8)
where we implicitly assume that entrepreneurs believe that the ﬁrm is continued, i.e., that tax
rate τk applies.7
An entrepreneur with ability at(i) who operates a newly founded ﬁrm and who has received
a bequest bt−1(i) from his parent, a worker, maximizes utility subject to
ct(i) = at(i)lt(i)αkt(i)1−α + (1 − τb)bt−1(i) + Tt − wtlt(i) − kt(i) − ¯ k, (9)
and (8), where we used (3) and (5) to obtain (9).
Entrepreneurs maximize utility through the optimal choice of employment of labor lt(i) and
capital kt(i). It is easy to check that an interior solution requires that wt > (1−α)
1−α
α αaH ≡ w.
We focus on this case throughout. Inserting (7), (8), and (9), respectively, in (1), stating the
ﬁrst order conditions, and solving for factor inputs we obtain8
kt(i) =





















˜ k(at(i),wt,τk) ≡ ˜ l(at(i),wt,τk). (10b)
Inspection of the solution shows that the size of an inheritance (kt−1 or bt−1, respectively)
does not aﬀect the choice of factor inputs, i.e. the size of the family ﬁrm. This outcome is a
7As will become apparent for this to be true it is suﬃcient to assume that entrepreneurs believe that their oﬀspring
has high entrepreneurial ability. The assumption is not critical for the main results.
8Also recall v(b) = (1 − η)
−1(b
1−η − 1) for η 6= 1 and v(b) = lnb otherwise.
10consequence of the assumed constant marginal utility from consumption. It prevents that lucky
dynasties for which nature draws several aH’s after another amass disproportionate wealth and
ﬁrm sizes. This way the range of possible types of dynasties is ﬁnite and an analytical solution
of the equilibrium is possible.9 The size of a bequest will be “only” responsible for the decision
to continue an inherited ﬁrm or not.
The size of the inheritance tax τk, however, may matter for the size of ﬁrms because it aﬀects
the current ﬁrm owner’s desire to leave bequests and through this channel aﬀects investment and
capital accumulation. Magnitude and sign of the eﬀect of higher taxes are generally ambiguous.
On the one hand, a substitution eﬀect reduces the incentive to invest. One the other hand,
there is also a wealth eﬀect because higher taxes reduce the net amount inherited by oﬀsprings.
For η = 1, the wealth eﬀect exactly counterweighs the substitution eﬀect and taxation does not
aﬀect factor inputs of a family ﬁrm. If η < 1, the substitution eﬀect dominates and higher taxes
reduce the incentive to invest into family businesses. Allowing for η < 1 we take a frequently
heard anti-inheritance tax argument into account (Holtz-Eakin, 1999, Prescott, 2006). Since
η ≤ 1 seems to be supported empirically, and in order to limit case diﬀerentiation, we ignore the
third possibility of η > 1, which would imply that higher capital taxes trigger higher investments
(but see Uhlig and Yanagawa, 1996).
Finally, the size of a ﬁrm, irrespective of whether inherited or not, depends on labor costs
and the ability of its owner-manager. Inspection of (10a) and (10b) shows that factor demand
is inversely related to the wage rate wt, an outcome that reﬂects the neoclassical shape of the
production function. Inspection shows also that less able managers lead smaller ﬁrms. Other
things equal, they prefer to install less machines and employ less workers. This outcome reﬂects
the complementarity of managerial skills and factor inputs.
3.2. Workers. A worker i who sells an inherited ﬁrm consumes
ct(i) = wt + (q − τs)(1 − δ)kt−1(i) + Tt − bt(i). (11)
If the worker is the oﬀspring of a worker, he consumes
ct(i) = wt + (1 − τb)bt−1(i) + Tt − bt(i). (12)
9The simplifying assumption entails the opportunity cost of a less rich wealth distribution. This cost seems to be
acceptable because we focus on the problem how inheritance taxation aﬀect eﬃciency of an economy. For eﬃciency,
the distribution of wealth is possibly of second order compared to the viability of low-ability entrepreneurs and
the transaction costs of ﬁrm dissolution and establishment.
11From utility maximization of workers we obtain that an optimal bequest requires v0(bnet
t (i)) = 1,
where bnet
t (i) = (1 − τb)bt(i). Thus, irrespective of social provenance a worker bequeaths
bt(i) = (1 − τb)
1−η
η ≡ ¯ b(τb). (13)
As for entrepreneurs, there is no long-run path dependency of wealth within dynasties since
bequests do not depend on inheritances.
3.3. Exit. Heirs of family ﬁrms abandon the business if they can enjoy higher utility as a worker
(and living oﬀ the receipts for the sold ﬁrm). Technically they compare utility (1) for (7), (8),
(10a) and (10b) with utility (1) for (11) and (13). In conclusion, a member of family i sells an
inherited ﬁrm in period t if and only if
g(at(i),wt,τk) + ∆(1 − δ) · ˜ k(at−1(i),wt−1,τk) < wt + B(τb) (14)
where











(1 − τk)(1 − δ)














Here, B is the net utility received from making a bequest as a worker (v(bnet) − b). Adding to
it the income of a worker (w) gives us the right hand side of (14). Likewise, the ﬁrst term on
the left hand side, g(a,w,τk), is the sum of an entrepreneur’s income (π) and net utility from
passing on the ﬁrm (v(bnet) − k).10
The second term on the left hand side of (14) sums up the missing items. The parameter ∆
can be conceptualized as the continuation value of a unit of business capital. If there are no
transaction costs of ﬁrm dissolution (q = 1) and no tax advantage of keeping the ﬁrm (τk = τs),
then the continuation value is zero. Otherwise ∆ is strictly positive and increasing in transaction
costs (1−q) and the tax advantage (τs−τk). Whenever ∆ > 0, the incentive to continue a family
business increases with the size of the bequest. Note that this implies that both high-ability and
low-ability heirs are more inclined to continue a family business if they have received it from a
10For the special case of η = 1 we have to redeﬁne B ≡ ln(1 − τb) and g(a,w,τk) ≡ ln[(1 − τk)(1 − δ)] −
ln
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12high-ability parent because, as explained above, high-ability entrepreneurs lead large ﬁrms.
Because highly able entrepreneurs generate more proﬁts, they get more utility out of their
entrepreneurship than their low-ability counterparts. To verify this observe that g(·) is strictly
increasing in ability at(i). Running a ﬁrm is also, ceteris paribus, more worthwhile if the wage
rate wt is low, i.e. cash ﬂow and proﬁts are high, and if the inheritance tax rate τk is low, i.e.
utility experienced from bequeathing the ﬁrm to the oﬀspring is high.
3.4. Entry. Now consider the entry decision of descendants of workers. They compare utility
(1) for (8), (9), and (10a) with utility (1) for (12) and (13). Thus, an oﬀspring of a worker-parent
i becomes an entrepreneur if and only if
g(at(i),wt,τk) − ¯ k ≥ wt + B(τb). (15)
As above, the right hand side of (15) comprises, for a worker, income plus net utility from
making a bequest and the ﬁrst term on the left hand side is the analogous expression for an
entrepreneur. With contrast to heirs of family ﬁrms, heirs of workers cannot experience any
continuation value from keeping a business. Instead they have to bear startup costs ¯ k. Not
surprisingly, higher entry costs mitigate the incentive to enter. Workers are also less inclined to
enter if wages are high because then, ceteris paribus, income of entrepreneurs is low and labor
income of workers is high. Inheritance taxes have, with respect to their tax base, opposing
eﬀects on entry. A higher tax rate applied to the bequests of descendants of workers (τb) raises
the incentive to enter, whereas a higher tax rate on bequeathed ﬁrms (τk) reduces it.
4. Equilibrium Analysis
At a steady-state, the number of exiting and entering ﬁrms coincide. To avoid only mildly in-
teresting case distinctions, we focus on parameter constellations such that there is entry and exit
in equilibrium. Low-ability descendants of workers, however, will never enter in entrepreneur-
ship. To see this, conclude from ∆ ≥ 0 and ¯ k ≥ 0 that according to (14) and (15) the incentive
to set up a new ﬁrm is never larger than the incentive to continue an inherited ﬁrm for any
given type of ability. Thus, in an equilibrium with exit of low-ability heirs of family ﬁrms there
cannot be simultaneously entry of low-ability heirs of workers.
While low-ability types never enter in equilibrium, high-ability types enter until the utility
from setting up and running a business is driven down to the utility from wage work. This is the
13case when the wage equalizes utility from entering and staying out, i.e. the steady-state wage
rate w∗ fulﬁls
g(aH,w∗,τk) − ¯ k = w∗ + B(τb). (16)
The equilibrium wage w∗ is unique because g(aH,w,τk) is strictly decreasing in the wage rate
whereas the utility from wage work is strictly increasing. Figure 1 visualizes the equilibrium.
Utility from running a ﬁrm increases with ability and decreases with the inheritance tax. In the
ﬁgure, higher ability aH and lower taxes on ﬁrms τk shift the g(aH,w,τk) curve upwards and
the resulting higher demand and lower supply of wage work leads to an equilibrium at a higher
wage rate. Likewise, higher start up costs ¯ k and lower inheritance taxes τb (implying higher net
utility from bequeathing B) shift the w + B(τb) + ¯ k curve upwards. A career as entrepreneur
becomes less attractive and higher supply and lower demand of workers are balanced by a smaller
equilibrium wage.










Finally, there has to be exit. According to the exit decision rule (14) there will be exit in
equilibrium if
g(aL,w∗,τk) + ∆(1 − δ)˜ k(aL,w∗,τk) < w∗ + B(τb). (A1)
Assumption A1 ensures that low-ability descendants of entrepreneurs exit if also their parent
had low ability. It is maintained throughout.
Interestingly, assumption A1 leaves scope for two structurally diﬀerent equilibria, which can
alternatively occur depending on the numerical speciﬁcation of the model’s parameters, i.e.
14depending on the speciﬁcation of technologies, preferences, institutions, and, most importantly,
the underlying inheritance tax policy. At the ﬁrst equilibrium low-ability heirs of family ﬁrms
always exit implying that only ﬁrms led by high-ability entrepreneurs are participating in the
market. At the alternative equilibrium low-ability heirs of family ﬁrms continue the business if
their parent was of high ability.
Intuitively, the likelihood that an economy is situated at the second equilibrium is high when
the continuation value ∆ is large. As explained, this is the case if either transaction costs entailed
by the sale of capital are high (low q) or if the government rewards a high tax advantage for
continued family ﬁrms, i.e. if τs−τk is large. In other words, if transactions costs are low and/or
the tax advantage is absent or low, then the continuation value is small and low-ability heirs are
more inclined to sell the ﬁrm and exit immediately irrespective of their parents’ ability. This
reasoning implies that there exists a threshold for the continuation value below which there are
only high-ability entrepreneurs present and above which the market is shared by entrepreneurs
of high and low-ability.
Before we show that the intuition is indeed true, to close the model note that total labor
demand equals supply in equilibrium; i.e.,
R nt
0 lt(i)di = 1 − nt. Let nL and nH denote the mass
(“number”) of ﬁrms led by entrepreneurs of type aL and aH, respectively. Using (10b) and
omitting the time index, labor market clearing implies
nL
h




˜ l(aH,w,τk) + 1
i
− 1 = 0. (17)
We denote the wage rate which is implicitly deﬁned in (17) by ˜ w(nL,nH,τk). It is strictly
increasing in both nL and nH (to see this, recall that ˜ l(a,w,τk) is decreasing in w). A larger
number of entrepreneurs of either kind raises labor demand and reduces labor supply; thus, the
equilibrium wage rate rises. Moreover, the eﬀect of an increase in τk on ˜ w is negative if η < 1 and
zero if η = 1. The following proposition speciﬁes the threshold value for ∆ which determines the
type of equilibrium and the number of participating ﬁrms of each type. (All proofs are relegated
to the Appendix).
Proposition 1. There is a threshold value
ˆ ∆ ≡
w∗ + B(τb) − g(aL,w∗,τk)
(1 − δ)˜ k(aH,w∗,τk)
(18)
15such that in long-run equilibrium the following holds:11
(i) For ∆ < ˆ ∆, there are only high-ability entrepreneurs in the market (i.e., nL = 0). The
number of ﬁrms, n = nH, is given by ˜ w(0,nH) = w∗, with w∗ as deﬁned by (16). In each period,
all ﬁrm-heirs who have drawn a low ability, i.e., (1−pH)·nH ﬁrms, exit. (Type 1 equilibrium.)
(ii) For ∆ > ˆ ∆, there are nL = (1−pH)·nH > 0 ﬁrms led by low-ability entrepreneurs in the
market and the number of high-ability entrepreneurs, nH, is given by ˜ w((1−pH)·nH,nH) = w∗.
In each period, all descendants of low-ability entrepreneurs who have low ability themselves, i.e.,
pL · nL ﬁrms, exit. (Type 2 equilibrium.)
Corollary 1. A long-run equilibrium for the composition of ﬁrms exists and is unique.
The next corollary shows how preferential tax treatment of continued businesses aﬀects the
type of equilibrium assumed by an economy.
Corollary 2. Starting from a Type 1 equilibrium where τk = τs, introducing a suﬃciently
pronounced preferential tax treatment of continued businesses (τs > τk) by raising tax rate τs
induces a transition to a Type 2 equilibrium.
It is interesting to examine in which type of equilibrium there are more ﬁrms led by high-ability
entrepreneurs. Using (17), this question is addressed in the next proposition.
Proposition 2. The number of ﬁrms led by high-ability entrepreneurs in an equilibrium of
Type 1 and Type 2 are given by
nH =
1
˜ l(aH,w∗,τk) + 1
≡ ˆ nH1, (19)
nH =
1
(1 − pH)˜ l(aL,w∗,τk) + ˜ l(aH,w∗,τk) + 2 − pH ≡ ˆ nH2, (20)
respectively, where w∗ is given by (16). In a Type 2 equilibrium there are more ﬁrms in total
but less ﬁrms led by high-ability entrepreneurs than in a Type 1 equilibrium ( ˆ nH2 < ˆ nH1).
The result in Proposition 2 implies that tax incentives for continuing family ﬁrms, possibly
established with the intention to save transaction costs entailed by ﬁrm dissolution and startup,
have a negative side-eﬀect on performance of the economy. If the economy assumes a Type 2
equilibrium as a consequence of preferential tax treatment, ﬁrms are continued although heirs
have low entrepreneurial ability. This continuation deters entry of high-ability descendants of
workers such that the equilibrium number of high-ability entrepreneurs is lower than without
such tax incentives. Crowding out of high-ability entrepreneurs, however, is not perfect because
11We will not consider the knife-edge (non-generic) case where ∆ = ˆ ∆.
16staying low-ability heirs run smaller businesses due to the managerial skill complementarity
with factor inputs. This implies that the impact of a staying low-ability entrepreneur on labor
demand and the wage rate is smaller than the impact of an entering high-ability entrepreneur,
i.e. ∂ ˜ w/∂nL < ∂ ˜ w/∂nH. In words, two staying low-ability heirs of family ﬁrms prevent entry of
less than two descendants of workers with high ability.
The partial crowding out of high-ability descendants of workers by low-ability owners of family
ﬁrms incurs a twofold burden on the economy. High-ability entrepreneurs invest more, which
has a positive eﬀect on economic performance. Furthermore high-ability entrepreneurs produce
more output for any given input combination. These losses of scale and productivity do not
necessarily imply the conclusion that a continuation-friendly tax system should be abandoned
(for eﬃciency reasons). The losses have to be compared with the potential gains from saved
transaction costs. And, of course, a continuation-friendly tax policy does not automatically
imply that a Type 2 equilibrium is assumed since the continuation value ∆ may be still below
the threshold.
Finally, note that Corollary 2 and Proposition 2 compare equilibria under the ceteris paribus
condition of holding τk constant. A clear-cut conclusion on theoretical grounds is thus only
possible if the preferential treatment of continued businesses results from a discriminatory tax
increase for sold businesses. In this case, τs rises at constant τk leaving equilibrium wages and
employment unaﬀected. Thus, if a transition from Type 1 to Type 2 equilibrium has been caused
by a change of τs, there will be unambiguously fewer high-ability entrepreneurs. In this case we
can furthermore prove the following result concerning aggregate welfare,
R 1
0 U(i)di.
Proposition 3. Introducing preferential tax treatment of continued businesses (τs > τk) by
raising tax rate τs, leaves aggregate welfare in a given type of equilibrium unaﬀected. If the
economy turns from a Type 1 to a Type 2 equilibrium, then a reduction of welfare is more likely
to occur if transaction costs are low (i.e., ¯ k is low and q is high).
If, however, the preferential treatment has (also) been caused by a tax cut for continued
businesses τk, we may observe possibly counteracting forces to the potentially arising negative
crowding-out eﬀect just discussed. This is because a decrease in τk aﬀects factor inputs of
entrepreneurs (directly and through raising the equilibrium wage rate w∗) and thereby may also
change the number of ﬁrms in a given type of equilibrium.12 The theoretical indeterminacy
12See (10a), (10b), (16), (19) and (20).
17in this empirically particularly relevant case makes the subsequent quantitative analysis all the
more important. We thus continue with a calibration of the model in order to further assess
the role of tax schemes and transaction costs on the continuation of family ﬁrms and on output,
investment, and utility of the
individual types of entrepreneurs and workers.
5. Calibration
We calibrate the model with German data. The case of Germany appears to be ideal because
inheritance law is in the process of reformation and several tax scenarios are currently highly
debated among legislature, jurisdiction, business associations, and the general public. According
to the old law, real estates and businesses get a preferential treatment vis-` a-vis cash, shares,
bonds, and other bequests, i.e. 0 < τk = τs < τb. This will be our policy case 1. Recently,
however, the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) has ruled against the
preferential treatment of particular kinds of bequests because it does not conform to the principle
of equality. This means that the current tax system can only operate until 2009. If there is no
tax reform until then, family ﬁrms will be treated like other bequests, i.e. 0 < τk = τs = τb, our
policy case 2.
The loophole left by the Constitutional Court is that preferential tax treatment is acceptable
if it is justiﬁably desirable from a general economic viewpoint. Against this background, many
see a reform that implements a preferential treatment of continued family ﬁrms as the most
likely outcome for the future. Such a policy could be justiﬁed by the argument that transac-
tions costs are saved through the avoidance of ﬁrm dissolution, therewith explaining a general
economic interest. Furthermore, a continuation-friendly inheritance tax would implement the
recommendations of the European Commission (see introduction). In December 2007 the Bun-
destag (the lower house of parliament) has launched a reform of the inheritance tax law which
yet needs approval by the Bundesrat (the upper house of parliament). It includes an 85 percent
exemption on business assets over a period of 10 years, as long as the sum of the salaries paid is
at least 70 percent of the original amount and as long as the heir keeps the business for at least
15 years. At the same time, however, depreciation and accounting rules have been tightened.
We thus try to approximate the preferential treatment of continued ﬁrms, 0 < τk < τs = τb, by
setting τk = τs/2, which constitutes our case 3.
18If the transaction cost argument really holds, it can be (and is indeed) argued in favor of a
complete abolishment of taxes on continued ﬁrms. According to the original proposal by Chan-
cellor Angela Merkel, for example, inheritance tax payments of family ﬁrms could be eﬀectively
reduced by 10 percent for every year that the heirs continue the business. As a consequence
the tax burden would be cut to zero within a decade, i.e. within less than a generation. No
taxes on inherited ﬁrms is thus our case 4, τk = 0,τs = τb > 0. Finally, for comparison, we
investigate case 5 according to which all taxes on inherited business are abolished irrespective of
their continuation. While this case is probably hypothetical for Germany, it might be relevant
elsewhere. Table 1 summarizes the set up of our policy experiment.
Table 1: Investigated Inheritance Tax Policies
case policy implementation
1 preferential treatment of family ﬁrms τk = τb/2 τs = τk
2 no preferential treatment τk = τb τs = τk
3 preferential treatment of continued ﬁrms τk = τb/2 τs = τb
4 no tax on continued ﬁrms τk = 0 τs = τb
5 no tax on family ﬁrms τk = 0 τs = 0
The typical ﬁrms that we have in mind when conducting the policy experiments are the small
and medium enterprises (SMEs) of the so called German “Mittelstand”, which encompasses
99 percent of all German companies and employs about 70 percent of the labor force.13 Four
percent of the German population lives in entrepreneur households, which would suggest to
match n to 0.04. On the other hand, the average SME owner employs 10 workers, which would
suggest that n equals 1/11 ≈ 0.09. We solve this dilemma by matching n = 0.07 (which is the
percentage of self-employed households in Germany).
Currently about 30 percent of Germany’s family businesses are planning on a succession of
the ﬁrm within the next years. According to a poll in the manufacturing sector 43 percent of
ﬁrm owners state that the expected inheritance tax reform will be of “very high” importance
for their solution of the succession problem. A further 27 percent state that the tax reform
will be of “high” importance. About 30 percent of entrepreneurs are reckoning on solving the
succession problem by selling or closing their ﬁrm. We thus try to match an exit rate of 0.3 with
our calibration.14
13For this and the following data on Germany’s SME, see Deutsche Bank (2007) and BDI (2006). According to
the EU deﬁnition, a SME has less than 250 employees and sales revenue not exceeding EUR 50 Mio.
14Many European countries (but not the U.S.) show similar characteristics. 99 percent of the European enterprises
are SMEs. The average European SME employs 6 people and 66% of the European labor force are employed in
19According to a study by ZEW (2004) the market value of the average German non-corporation
is 4.4 million Euros. Under the current law the marginal tax rate on an inheritance of this size
(if inherited by a son or daughter) is 19 percent. Yet, inherited family businesses are treated
favorably. Besides the possibility to defer tax payment, family ﬁrms are also entitled to a 35 %
discount of the tax base, and other forms of relief. According to ZEW’s calculations the eﬀective
average inheritance tax rate on a family ﬁrm of average size would be just 3.8%. For the model’s
calibration we are, however, interested in marginal taxes. We thus set τb = 0.19 and account for
the beneﬁcial treatment of ﬁrm wealth by setting τk = τs = 1/2 · τb in our policy case 1.15
We calibrate the marginal elasticity of utility from bequests, η, according to the estimates in
Kopczuk and Slemrod (2001). The most applicable of their results is probably the correlation
of the reported estates with the estate tax at age 45 of the donor. This allows us to imagine age
45 as the age at which a new generation takes over the family ﬁrm and starts planning about
bequests. The elasticity of the bequest with respect to 1 minus the tax rate is estimated as 0.16,
implying (1−η)/η = 0.16. This leads to the speciﬁcation of η = 0.862 in our benchmark setup.
By sensitivity analysis we take into account that Kopczuk and Slemrod have reported diﬀerent
estimates for alternative speciﬁcations, sometimes insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, and that
their study was anyway carried out with data for U.S. households.
The speciﬁcation of managerial ability and the intergenerational inheritance of managing skills
are based as closely as possible on the innovative calibration of these parameters by Caselli and
Gennaioli (2006). They show that for a steady-state distribution of ability the probabilities to
inherit one’s parent ability must fulﬁl pL = 1 − λ + λµ and pH = λ + µ − λµ for a given share
of high-ability types in the population λ and a given intergenerational correlation of talent µ.
Based on the psychological literature about the inheritance of IQ (and hoping that transmission
of managerial talent behaves not too diﬀerently) they ﬁx µ = 0.4. Interestingly this value
is not too far away from Galton’s (1877) famous 1/3 observed for height and other personal
characteristics that are inherited by nature. Casselli and Gennaioli then set λ = 0.1 and use
the implied values of pH and pL together with Perez-Gonzales’ (2001) estimate that dynastic
successions in the U.S. lead to an average decline in the return on assets of 20 percent to come
SMEs (but only 33% of the U.S. labor force). See European Commission (2003) and Deutsche Bank (2007).
15In many European countries there are similar preferential treatments of inherited ﬁrm wealth. Interestingly,
the ZEW study also computes the hypothetical eﬀective tax rate that would apply for the average German ﬁrm
in 15 other countries. In the resulting ranking Germany’s actual tax is placed just in the middle at number 7 with
many Western European countries relatively close by. The most prominent outliers are the U.K. (zero tax rate)
and the U.S. (36 %). Note that we take care of less and more favorable tax treatments with our policy cases 2-5.
20up with the result that aH = 1.33·aL (all parameter names are adjusted to the present paper’s
notation).
Of course, we cannot adopt all parameter values from their study because we are dealing
with a diﬀerent model. Since Caselli and Gennaioli admit to know relatively little about λ, the
population share of managerially talented people, we take this as our “degree of freedom”. We
thus set µ = 0.4 and aH = 1.33·aL and take over the two equations determining pL and pH but
use λ to adjust our model to the empirical exit ratio.
On average the startup of a new business in Germany takes 42 days and costs 15.7 percent
of GDP per capita, according to Djankov et al. (2002). In order to relate these numbers to our
speciﬁcation of ¯ k we have to take into account that Djankov et al.’s ﬁgures are based on GDP
per capita per year whereas our model economy produces GDP per generation. The length of
a generation is best conceptualized as the length of the time period spend by a member of a
dynasty of entrepreneurs as head of the business. Imagining that he has inherited the ﬁrm from
his grandfather when he was 45 years old and will bequest the ﬁrm to his son when he is 70
gives an estimate for period length of 25 years. Comparing the monetary start-up costs with
our model-GDP per capita at the initial steady-state (which is 3.22 such that the annual GDP
per capita equals 3.22/25 = 0.129) we get an estimate of ¯ k = 0.129 × 0.157 = 0.02. However,
we may also want to include time costs taking account of lost opportunities for the non-working
ﬁrm founder. Djankov et al. estimate total startup costs, including monetary and time cost, as
32.5 percent of GDP per capita. This renders an estimate of ¯ k = 0.042. We take this as our
benchmark value and conduct sensitivity analysis.
A parameter we know little about is q. We try to get around the uncertainty problem by
conducting two experiments. Given the numerical speciﬁcation of the model, it turned out that
the equilibrium threshold of Proposition 1 is crossed for a value of q between 0.7 and 0.75. We
ﬁrst consider the case of 0.75 for which the economy is situated at a Type 1 equilibrium, i.e. given
the initial tax policy all ﬁrms are led by high-ability entrepreneurs. When q = 0.7 the benchmark
economy is situated at a Type 2 equilibrium where the market is shared by entrepreneurs of high
and low ability. Qualitatively, the ﬁrst scenario captures the notion that transaction costs are
relatively low and that Germany’s Mittelstand entrepreneurs are of high ability. The notion that
high transaction costs in the process of ﬁrm dissolution are an important structural problem
and that there are also low-ability entrepreneurs present in Germany’s economy is captured by
21the second scenario. Following numerous previous calibration exercises we set the capital share
(1 − α) to 0.4.
We ﬁx the remaining three parameters, the value of low-ability skills aL, the share of the
managerially talented people λ, and the depreciation rate δ so that the model matches three
statistics: the share of entrepreneurs in the population (n = 0.07), the exit rate, i.e. the number
of exiting entrepreneurs relative to the number of entrepreneurs (0.3 as explained above), and
the wealth share hold by entrepreneurs. Denote the capital stock employed by high-ability and
low-ability entrepreneurs by kH and kL, respectively. According to the model, the wealth share
is easily be found by comparing total (after tax) wealth of entrepreneurs (nHkH + nLkL)(1 −
δ)(1−τk) and total wealth of workers (1−n)(1−τb)¯ b. Empirically, however, we were not able to
ﬁnd the appropriate statistics. In the U.S. entrepreneurs hold 40% of total wealth according to
Quadrini (2000). For Germany we know that the self-employed hold 15% of all wealth (ZEW,
2005). One explanation for the unexpectedly huge cross-country diﬀerence is that not all self-
employed are entrepreneurs, certainly not in the spirit of the current model. Another known
statistics is that the highest decile of Germany’s wealth distribution holds 47% of total wealth.
Perhaps this value ﬁts our model better. Again, we meet the parameter uncertainty by choosing
an “intermediate” value of 40%. From benchmark settings we obtain the missing parameters as
aL = 2.25, λ = 0.5 and δ = 0.61. Together with µ = 0.4, λ = 0.5 implies pL = pH = 0.7.
6. The Quantitative Impact of Inheritance Tax Reforms
As explained, we investigate ﬁve policy cases for an economy that is initially situated at one
of two types of equilibria. For each case and type of equilibrium we evaluate several statistics:
the number of ﬁrms and the number of high-ability entrepreneurs, the exit rate and entry
rate, i.e. the share of descendants of workers who become entrepreneur, income per capita y, the
aggregate capital labor ratio k/l, aggregate TFP, investment rates of entrepreneurs, savings rates
of workers, and the utility experienced by the diﬀerent groups in our model society. Finally we
compute aggregate welfare as the weighted sum of utilities where the weights are the population
shares of the diﬀerent groups.
Table 2 summarizes the results when there are only high-ability entrepreneurs initially, i.e. in
our policy case 1. The ﬁrst column shows the performance of the economy for policy case 1. The
fact that low-ability heirs exit immediately implies the assumption of a relatively high presence
22of high-ability types in the economy and a relatively high probability to inherit managerial
talent. According to Proposition 1, the exit rate equals 1−pH in Type 1 equilibrium (matched
to 30 percent initially, given a probability to inherit one’s parent high managerial skills of
pH = 0.7) and pLnL/n in Type 2 equilibrium. The entry rate is (1 − pH)nH/(1 − nH) in Type
1 and pLnL/(1 − n) in Type 2 equilibrium. In policy case 1 about 2.2 percent of descendants
of workers become entrepreneur. One sees also that the model is able to reﬂect the empirical
regularity found by Gentry and Hubbard (2004) that investment of new entrants (inventer) is
much higher than investment of heirs of family ﬁrms (invstay). The savings rate of heirs who
abandon a family ﬁrm (sexit) and become worker is relatively low compared to that of workers
who are descendant of workers (sstayout). To understand this outcome note that in a Type 1
equilibrium low-ability heirs exit immediately. This implies that low-ability heirs of family ﬁrms
must have inherited the ﬁrm from a high-ability parent. High ability parents in turn run large
ﬁrms, which makes the exiting low-ability heirs much wealthier than workers. They can largely
live oﬀ their inherited wealth. This fact is also reﬂected by utilities. Exiting low-ability heirs of
family ﬁrms experience utility (uexit) of a magnitude more closely to that of staying high-ability
entrepreneurs (u
high−high
stay ) than to that of descendants of workers (uenter).16
Policy case 2 abolishes the preferential tax treatment of inherited businesses (increase in both
τk and τs). The economy remains in a Type 1 equilibrium implying that the incentive to exit
is unchanged. The incentive to enter however gets lower, there are 10 percent less ﬁrms in
the market and wages are lower, according to (16). Consequently, ﬁrms operate a somewhat
less capital intensive technology. With less capital but more labor employed output per capita
remains almost unchanged. Investment rates are somewhat lower for entering entrepreneurs
but much higher for staying entrepreneurs because they have to replace the capital stock lost
through increased inheritance tax payments. Workers are beneﬁtting from the reform because
the small loss through lower wages is overcompensated by transfers from the redistribution of
tax revenue. Utility of workers (uenter) is higher than under the initial policy. Aggregate welfare
remains unchanged; the reform has “only” distributional consequences. In particular we observe
a pronounced eﬀect on the wealth share of entrepreneurs (wealth) which is reduced by three
percentage points.
Policy case 3, the preferential tax treatment of continued ﬁrms triggers a structural break.
16Recall that descendants of workers who enter the market as entrepreneurs have in equilibrium the same utility
as those who stay out.
23Table 2: Consequences of inheritance tax policy
when there are only high-ability entrepreneurs initially (Type 1 equilibrium)
case 1 case 2 case 3 case 4 case 5
n (in %) 7.00 6.29 8.81 9.66 7.70
nH (in %) 7.00 6.29 6.78 7.43 7.70
exit rate (in %) 30.00 30.00 6.92 6.92 30.00
entry rate (in %) 2.26 2.01 0.67 0.74 2.50
y 3.22 3.23 2.41 2.40 3.21
k/l 1.48 1.47 1.84 1.86 1.50
TFP 2.96 2.96 2.79 2.79 2.96
wealth (in %) 40.00 37.1 40.31 43.05 42.7
invstay (in %) 27.77 29.15 27.77 26.37 26.37
inventer (in %) 41.14 41.02 41.14 41.26 41.26
sexit (in %) 10.70 11.03 29.29 29.72 10.43
sstayout (in %) 25.39 25.05 25.41 25.76 25.75
u
high−high
stay 15.32 15.31 15.32 15.34 15.34
u
high−low
stay - - 12.99 13.08 -
u
low−high
stay - - 8.99 9.02 -
uexit 13.36 13.14 8.72 8.68 13.55
uenter 9.13 9.17 9.13 9.08 9.08
welfare 9.52 9.52 9.49 9.49 9.52
Parameters: q = 0.75, α = 0.4, δ = 0.61, ¯ k = 0.042, η = 0.86,
a
L = 2.25, a
H = 1.33a
L, µ = 0.4, λ = 0.5, τb = 0.19. TFP denotes
aggregate productivity, y is income per capita, “wealth” denotes
the wealth share of entrepreneurs, invx and sx denotes investment
and savings rates of group x, ux is utility of group x. See text for
further explanations.
Motivated by tax alleviation low-ability heirs continue the family business unless they have
inherited it from a low-ability parent. As a consequence, the market is shared by high and
low-ability entrepreneurs. Note that coming from case 1 our case 3 implies an increase of τs at
constant τk, i.e. the scenario which has been already covered analytically by Corollary 2 and
Proposition 2 and 3. Since the policy change is obviously strong enough to initiate the threshold
crossing we know already from formal analysis that we can expect more ﬁrms in total, less ﬁrms
led by high-ability entrepreneurs, and lower aggregate welfare.
Besides low-ability entrepreneurs there occurs a second new species at a Type 2 equilibrium:
high-ability heirs of low-ability entrepreneurs. These are the talented grandsons of talented
founders and sons of untalented fathers. We observe some crowding out of high-ability en-
trepreneurs, but the more pronounced eﬀect is the increased total number of ﬁrms in the mar-
ket. We observe also a huge drop of exit and entry rates showing that the continuation-friendly
24policy is indeed very eﬀective with respect of preventing exit.
Unfortunately, lower exit and entry implies also less creative destruction and entails detri-
mental eﬀects on output per capita and aggregate TFP. On average, ﬁrms are now smaller and
employ less workers per unit of capital. Workers lose from the policy change since they receive
less transfers from tax revenue.
The most drastic eﬀect of the policy is that on utility of exiting entrepreneurs (uexit), a
“third-generation” eﬀect that seems to be completely overlooked in the public debate. Exiting
entrepreneurs are now suﬀering not only from loss through transaction costs but also from the
fact that they have inherited their ﬁrm from a low-ability parent who was caused to continue
the family business inherited from a high-ability grandparent. This makes the inheritance of
descendants of low-ability entrepreneurs – and therefore their utility – smaller than that of
descendants of workers. The staying high-ability heirs of low-ability fathers continue the business
but fare only little better than the exiting ones and worse than entering entrepreneurs (workers)
although these have to bear the startup cost. Altogether this outcome strikingly demonstrates
the power of a low-ability entrepreneur in driving down business wealth.
One might think that at least one group in society beneﬁts from the saved transaction costs,
namely the staying low-ability heirs of high-ability entrepreneurs (e.g. the sons and daughters of
the founder of the ﬁrm). In case 3 they prefer to stay and experience utility of u
high−low
stay =12.99
against exiting and receiving utility of 12.21 (the latter hypothetical outcome is not shown in
the Table). Interestingly, however, the general equilibrium analysis reveals that even this group
experiences higher utility in case 1 and case 2 when it exits immediately but beneﬁts from the
generally more favorable macroeconomic conditions (and experiences utility of 13.36 or 13.14,
respectively). In conclusion, not only is the continuation-friendly policy clearly welfare reducing
but also there is not even a single group in society beneﬁting from it in general equilibrium.
With case 4 we consider the complete abolishment of taxes on continued family ﬁrms. Struc-
turally the case is identical to the previous one. The economy assumes again a Type 2 equi-
librium. Utility improves only slightly for high-ability heirs of family ﬁrms and is still lower
for staying low-ability heirs compared to case 1 and 2 where they abandon the family business.
Finally, case 5 shows the consequences of abolishing taxes on inherited family businesses irre-
spective of their continuation. This policy re-establishes the Type 1 equilibrium and leads to an
overall increase of ﬁrms led by high-ability entrepreneurs through increasing entry. We observe
25small gains for high-ability entrepreneurs and large gains for exiting heirs of family ﬁrms. Work-
ers, the largest in group in society, lose somewhat and aggregate welfare remains unchanged.
One also sees that the policy improves social mobility; some former workers are attracted to
entrepreneurship and the entry rate rises by 0.24 percentage points. As a side-eﬀect this leads
to increasing wealth inequality.
Table 3: Consequence Inheritance tax policy
when there is mixed ability of entrepreneurs initially (Type 2 equilibrium)
case 1 case 2 case 3 case 4 case 5
n (in %) 7.00 6.31 7.00 7.68 7.68
nH (in %) 4.55 4.10 4.55 4.99 4.99
exit rate (in %) 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00
entry rate (in %) 2.26 2.02 2.26 2.49 2.49
y 2.55 2.57 2.55 2.54 2.54
k/l 2.41 2.39 2.41 2.43 2.43
TFP 3.09 3.09 3.09 3.09 3.09
wealth (in %) 40.00 37.18 40.00 42.62 42.62
invstay (in %) 29.48 30.63 29.48 28.32 28.32
inventer (in %) 40.70 40.62 40.70 40.77 40.77
sexit (in %) 25.19 25.26 25.60 25.95 25.12
sstayout (in %) 22.02 21.72 22.00 22.28 22.32
u
high−high
stay 19.26 19.25 19.26 19.28 19.27
u
high−low
stay 16.31 16.21 16.31 16.41 16.40
u
low−high
stay 9.36 9.35 9.36 9.38 9.37
uexit 9.15 9.14 9.10 9.06 9.16
uenter 9.60 9.65 9.60 9.56 9.55
welfare 9.96 9.96 9.96 9.96 9.96
Parameters: as in Table 2 except q = 0.7 which requires recalibra-
tion: δ = 0.67, a
L = 2.54, λ = 0.102 to match the model economy’s
characteristics.
In Table 3 we turn to the Type 2 scenario by setting q = 0.7 so that transaction costs become
large enough for the ﬁrst generation of low-ability heirs to keep an inherited ﬁrm already for
policy case 1, i.e. although the inheritance tax policy is not continuation-friendly. The fact that
low-ability entrepreneurs stay implies that we have to recalibrate the three “free parameters”
in order to meet the imposed statistics. The strongest eﬀect is here on λ. For matching an exit
rate of 30 percent we have to assume that only 10 percent of the population are endowed with
high managerial ability. As consequence, the probability to inherit one’s parent high ability pH
falls from 0.7 to 0.46 whereas pL rises to 0.94. We also have to assume that low-ability ﬁrms
are generally more productive (aL rises to 2.54) implying that we cannot make any quantitative
26cross-scenario comparisons between Table 2 and Table 3.
Given that the economy is already at a Type 2 equilibrium initially, no tax reform induces a
threshold crossing and, consequently, policy eﬀects are comparatively small. Interestingly, the
macroeconomic variables assume almost identical values under case 1 and 3. This suggests that
a transition towards a continuation-friendly policy is indeed capable to preserve the status quo
outcome if the status quo policy has to be abandoned (as requested by the German Constitutional
Court). If we can justiﬁably assume that the economy is situated at a Type 2 equilibrium and
preserving the status quo is the policy goal, then the case 3 policy is clearly eﬀective.
The case 4 policy, i.e. the abolishment of all taxes on continued ﬁrms improves slightly wel-
fare of heirs of high-ability entrepreneurs at the expense of workers and heirs of low-ability
entrepreneurs. Case 5, which abolishes all taxes on family ﬁrms, does not lead to any further
important changes. The most pronounced eﬀect compared to case 4 is the higher utility of
exiting heirs because the tax law does not punish them any longer for not keeping the business.
As a consequence they can enjoy more utility from consumption, visible also in the drop of the
savings rate of exiting heirs of family ﬁrms.
For an intuition of these results, observe that inheritance tax policy has its most pronounced
eﬀects through exit decisions if the economy is at a Type 1 equilibrium (Table 2) but operates ex-
clusively through the entry decision at a Type 2 equilibrium (Table 3). At a Type 2 equilibrium,
a continuation-friendly tax policy aﬀects saving and utility of staying and exiting entrepreneurs
but it cannot aﬀect the exit rate, at least not when there is exit according to our assumption
A1, i.e. when two low-ability heirs in a row always imply exit. Since the continuation-friendly
policy runs through entry of new entrepreneurs, it operates like a general reduction of taxes on
family ﬁrms. This is clearly visible in Table 3. Entry rises as the tax on family ﬁrms decreases
irrespective of whether the policy is tied to continuation. Interestingly, at a Type 2 equilibrium
a policy intended to be continuation-friendly is indeed continuation-neutral and entry-friendly.
A general observance is that tax reforms have only mild consequences at a Type 2 equilibrium
compared to their drastic eﬀects at a Type 1 equilibrium. We therefore focus the following
sensitivity analysis on scenarios where there are only high-ability entrepreneurs initially. Given
limited space we present only three macro variables, the number of high-ability entrepreneurs,
income per capita, and aggregate welfare. The most interesting result so far was that the
continuation-friendly policy failed completely: It has reduced aggregate welfare and the targeted
27persons, i.e. entrepreneurs who exit in case 1 and 2 but are made to continue the business
under case 3 and 4, have been actually made worse oﬀ. In order to verify the robustness of
this result we also report utility of members of this group, the low-ability heirs of high-ability
entrepreneurs, denoted by uhigh−low. These persons remain entrepreneurs in Type 2 equilibrium
(uhigh−low = u
high−low
stay ) and become workers in Type 1 equilibrium (uhigh−low = uexit). For
better comparison Table 4 begins with reiterating the values of these four variables for the
benchmark calibration.
Table 4: Sensitivity analysis
case 1 case 2 case 3 case 4 case 5 explanation
Benchmark nH (in %) 7.00 6.29 6.78 7.43 7.70 speciﬁcation as
y 3.22 3.23 2.41 2.40 3.21 in Table 2
uhigh−low 13.36 13.14 12.99 13.08 13.55
welfare 9.52 9.52 9.49 9.49 9.52
¯ k = 0.1 nH (in %) 7.00 6.29 6.77 7.43 7.70 high entry costs
y 3.13 3.14 2.34 2.33 3.12
uhigh−low 13.31 13.08 13.01 13.11 13.49
welfare 9.46 9.46 9.44 9.44 9.46
η = 0.99 nH (in %) 7.00 6.30 6.77 7.41 7.69 no eﬀect of tax
y 3.31 3.32 2.47 2.46 3.30 on size of bequest
uhigh−low 106.34 106.11 105.99 106.08 106.52
welfare 102.37 102.37 102.34 102.34 102.37
η = 0.6 nH (in %) 7.00 6.26 6.79 7.49 7.74 high eﬀect of tax
y 2.75 2.75 2.06 2.05 2.75 on size of bequest
uhigh−low 7.79 7.56 7.52 7.62 7.98
welfare 4.33 4.33 4.31 4.31 4.33
µ = 0 nH (in %) 7.00 6.29 6.64 7.26 7.70 no intergen.
y 3.22 3.23 2.06 2.04 3.21 correlation of IQ
uhigh−low 13.36 13.14 12.99 13.09 13.55 i.e. exit rate=50
welfare 9.49 9.49 9.45 9.45 9.49
µ = 0.8 nH (in %) 7.00 6.29 6.92 7.61 7.70 high intergen.
y 3.22 3.23 2.90 2.89 3.21 correlation of IQ
uhigh−low 13.36 13.14 12.99 13.08 13.55 i.e. exit rate=10
welfare 9.55 9.55 9.54 9.54 9.55
aH/aL = 1.6 nH (in %) 7.00 6.29 6.82 7.48 7.70 higher ability
y 3.22 3.23 2.42 2.41 3.21 diﬀerential
uhigh−low 13.36 13.14 12.74 12.83 13.55
welfare 9.52 9.52 9.49 9.49 9.52
τb = 0.35 nH (in %) 7.00 5.57 6.78 8.09 8.41 higher
y 3.11 3.13 2.32 2.30 3.09 initial tax
uhigh−low 11.97 11.54 11.38 11.56 12.26
welfare 9.13 9.13 9.10 9.10 9.13
28We ﬁrst consider robustness against substantially higher entry costs, ¯ k = 0.1, implying startup
costs of more than 70 percent of annual GDP. The incentive for descendants to enter en-
trepreneurship declines implying lower equilibrium wages and lower income per capita. As a
consequence staying low-ability entrepreneurs lose relatively less if the tax system causes them
to keep an inherited business (case 3). Yet they would still be better oﬀ by exiting and be-
coming workers (as under case 1, 2 and 5). As before, aggregate welfare is lowest under a
continuation-friendly tax policy (cases 3 and 4).
Next we discuss the eﬀect of varying the marginal elasticity of utility from bequests. For
η = 0.99 ≈ 1 income and substitution eﬀects approximately balance each other. This closes the
bequest channel and all eﬀects operate through exit and entry. Structurally results remain very
similar to the benchmark case indicating, once more, that exit and entry are the dominating
eﬀect of policy reforms in Type 1 equilibria. For η = 0.6 we observe similar results. If the
continuation-friendly policy is drastic (case 4), it makes staying low-ability entrepreneurs slightly
better oﬀ than under the non-preferential policy (case 2). Yet, all the beneﬁts run through the
channel of generally lower taxes as a comparison with the non-preferential case 5 reveals.
We next consider alternative assumptions about the intergenerational correlation of managing
ability, µ. If we would recalibrate the model to match the statistics there would no change of
policy eﬀects at all because λ would adjust. In order to provoke an eﬀect we ﬁx λ at its original
value (λ = 0.5) implying that the model now predicts higher exit rates for lower µ and lower exit
rates for higher µ. We consider the limiting case without any inheritance of managing ability
(µ = 0) and a very high intergenerational correlation of ability (µ = 0.8). In both cases there
are no surprises. Structurally, the core variables react to tax reforms as for the benchmark
calibration.
Furthermore, we consider a higher diﬀerential between high and low-ability entrepreneurs. For
the model to match the statistics we have to recalibrate aL = 1.87, i.e. low-ability entrepreneurs
are less talented. Because aH is kept at its benchmark level, there are no changes of policy
eﬀects if there are only high-ability entrepreneurs. If there are low-ability entrepreneurs, the
most pronounced eﬀect is the high utility loss experienced by low-ability heirs when the policy
causes them to continue the family ﬁrm (cases 3 and 4).
Finally we consider a signiﬁcantly higher tax on inheritances other than family ﬁrms (τb is
raised from 0.19 to 0.35). While, of course, aggregate welfare is decreasing in the degree of
29distortionary taxation, results remain structurally identical to the benchmark case.
Summarizing, aggregate welfare under the continuation-friendly policy 3 is never higher than
under the non-preferential policy 2. Welfare remains unchanged if the continuation-friendly
policy is ineﬀective with respect to continuation, i.e. when it does not manage to motivate
heirs of family ﬁrms to keep the business. If it is eﬀective, welfare is lower than under the
unconditionally ﬁrm-friendly policy 1 and under the non-preferential tax policy 2 in all numerical
speciﬁcations of the model investigated. In other words, the positive transaction-cost eﬀect from
ﬁrm continuation never dominates the negative creative-destruction eﬀect.
Income per capita is always lowest under the continuation-friendly policy and low-ability heirs
that are made to continue a family ﬁrm always lose vis-` a-vis any other policy. Moreover, there is
a negative “third generation” eﬀect indicating substantial welfare losses for heirs of low-ability
entrepreneurs who were caused to continue a family business by tax allowances. From that
we cannot conclude that taxes on family ﬁrms should be generally high. Aggregate income is
second highest and utility of all types of entrepreneurs and of the heirs is highest for case 5, i.e.
when there are unconditionally no taxes on family ﬁrms. However, workers who are descendants
of workers are the losers in this scenario. Perhaps, their children or grandchildren will beneﬁt
through the increasing upward mobility created by the entry-friendly no-tax policy.
7. Growth Effects
Finally we consider the dynamic forces of creative destruction and extend the model to al-
low for productivity growth. Growth is endogenous in the sense that it depends on the frac-
tion of high-ability entrepreneurs in the population, nH. The assumption that high-ability
entrepreneurs are extraordinarily innovative and exert positive spill-over eﬀects among en-
trepreneurs ﬁnds support in a recent paper by van Praag and Versloot (2007). There, the authors
provide a meta-study on the contribution of entrepreneurs (young ﬁrms with less than 100 em-
ployees) on aggregate productivity growth and conclude that entrepreneurial ﬁrms “engender
relatively much employment creation, productivity growth and produce and commercialize high
quality innovations” (p. 1).
In order to take these results into account we modify the production function slightly. Output
of the ﬁrm of entrepreneur i at time t is now given by
yt(i) = at(i)(Atlt(i))αkt(i)1−α, (21)
30where At measures aggregate productivity. A0 > 0 is given. Increasing productivity over time
reﬂects labor-saving technological progress. We assume that productivity growth is positively





where h0(·) > 0.
The basic model is modiﬁed further in two ways. First, in order to capture that startup costs
grow along with the stage of economic development, we calculate them as κt = ¯ kAt. Second,
we assume that utility is derived from levels of consumption and net bequest adjusted for
productivity. This modelling expresses the idea that individuals have high aspirations when the
general degree of economic development is high.17 Formally, let ˆ z = z/A denote the productivity-
adjusted level of a variable z and modify the utility function (1) to
Ut(i) = ˆ ct(i) + v(ˆ bnet
t (i)). (23)
With these extensions and modiﬁcations of the basic model we obtain that ˆ kt(i) = ˜ k(at(i), ˆ wt,τk),
ˆ lt(i) = ˜ l(at(i), ˆ wt,τk) and ˆ bt(i) = ¯ b(τb), where the functions ˜ k, ˜ l and ¯ b have been deﬁned in Sec-
tion 3. Consequently, all results of Sections 3 and 4 remain virtually unchanged. (Formally, we
just need to replace w by ˆ w in equations (17)-(20).) At a steady-state, the wage rate (w∗), cap-
ital inputs, bequests, consumption and output all grow at the same rate, h(nH). Consequently,
we can prove the following result.
Proposition 4. Introducing preferential tax treatment of continued businesses (τs > τk)
by raising tax rate τs reduces economic growth if the economy turns from Type 1 to Type 2
equilibrium.
The result immediately follows from the fact that a change from Type 1 to Type 2 equilibrium
reduces the number of high-ability entrepreneurs (Proposition 2). Again, the situation is less
easily assessed if the preferential treatment is also caused by a tax cut for continued ﬁrms
because negative crowding-out eﬀects possibly counteract with positive, entry provoking eﬀects
through increasing net returns on capital. Inspecting our results from Table 2 we see that the
expansive eﬀect in fact dominates for the drastic reform case 4 that abolishes taxes on continued
17There is a voluminous literature which supports this notion. See e.g. Grossmann (2001, ch. 2) for a survey.
Technically, the assumption leads to simple steady-state expressions for the model’s core variables.
31ﬁrms entirely. For our policy case 3 and – as established analytically – any other reform that
unilaterally raises taxes on sold businesses such that a threshold crossing of equilibria occurs
results are always unambiguous. The crowding out of highly ably entrants by less able heirs
reduces growth.
8. Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed the consequences of inheritance tax reforms on the career
decision of individuals and on the aggregate performance of economies. We have argued that
the transaction-cost channel, which is mostly emphasized in the public debate, interacts with
a creative-destruction channel. This way, the continuation of family ﬁrms does not only save
agency- and start-up costs through less ﬁrm dissolution and less setup of new ones, it may also
lead to less entry into entrepreneurship by highly able descendants of workers. Within a general
equilibrium model we have shown analytically that there are two types of equilibria – one where
ﬁrms are exclusively led by highly able entrepreneurs and one where the market is shared by
entrepreneurs of high and low ability – and that the design of inheritance taxes has the power
to inﬂuence the type of equilibrium that an economy assumes.
Using a numerical implementation of the model we have quantitatively investigated the conse-
quences of some currently discussed tax reforms. In a nutshell, we have found that the preferen-
tial treatment of continued family ﬁrms is either ineﬀective or disastrous depending on whether
it causes a threshold crossing of general equilibrium.
If the preferential tax is ineﬀective it does neither change aggregate welfare nor the rate of
exiting entrepreneurs. It improves slightly welfare of staying entrepreneurs of both high and
low ability at the expense of a slight welfare deterioration of both workers and exiting heirs of
low-ability entrepreneurs.
If the preferential tax is disastrous, it impedes entry and leads to a qualitative change of
equilibria that entails a reduction of aggregate welfare as well as of welfare of the targeted group,
i.e., the heirs of family ﬁrms that are caused to keep an inherited business. While also workers
suﬀer slightly from deteriorating macroeconomic performance, the most dramatic consequence of
the reform is a “third-generation” eﬀect which seems to be completely overlooked in the current
debate. Welfare of the exiting sons and daughters of low-ability entrepreneurs is cut down by
almost 40 percent irrespective of whether they are themselves of high ability and rebuilt the
32family ﬁrm or of low ability and exit into wage work. If low-ability entrepreneurs continue the
business and run down family wealth by investing too little (which is the optimal choice given
their low entrepreneurial skills), they make their heirs worse oﬀ than the descendants of workers.
Given that our sensitivity analysis has conﬁrmed these results to be robust against parameter
variations, we feel save to conclude that our theory does not support preferential tax treatment
of continued ﬁrms as, for example, suggested by the European Commission and as currently
implemented or debated in many countries. Having said this, some qualiﬁcations regarding the
magnitude of eﬀects are in order. So far, we only managed to derive our results under some
simplifying assumptions. Most notably, the empirical distribution of entrepreneurial ability
is certainly not bivariate but continuous. However, as long as there are heirs of superior and
inferior management skills and as long as a continuation-friendly policy causes some less talented
heirs to continue a business, the general mechanism developed in this paper is still at work.
Secondly, a more general utility function would make inheritances path-dependent. If a lucky
dynasty experiences several generations of highly able entrepreneurs in a row it may amass
disproportionately big fortunes and additional wealth eﬀects occur that are currently ignored.
These distributional consequences may be of second order for our theory, however, which is
based solely on eﬃciency arguments. Anyway, given the empirical evidence mentioned in the
introduction regarding the performance of entrepreneurs of second and third generation, several
lucky draws in a row seem to be more exception than rule.
Nevertheless, instead of claiming that the proposed theory should be the last word on the
theoretical and empirical investigation of tax induced ﬁrm-continuation, we view it as a ﬁrst step
into this new ﬁeld. Extensions getting rid of the simpliﬁcations mentioned above are interesting
(yet challenging) tasks for future research. Other interesting further developments could result
from the introduction of psychological and sociological elements, for example amenities (ego-
rents) from “being entrepreneur”, the intergenerational transmission of family values, and peer
pressure (from the parent generation) to carry on the business.
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Proof of Proposition 1. First, suppose ∆ < ˆ ∆, which is equivalent to
g(aL,w∗,τk) + ∆(1 − δ)˜ k(aH,w∗,τk) < w∗ + B(τb). (24)
In this case, in steady state (i.e., wt = wt−1 = w∗ as given by (16)) it is attractive for low-ability
descendants of entrepreneurs to exit even if the parent had high ability, according to (14). Thus,
all low-ability descendants of entrepreneurs exit, such that nL = 0. This implies ˜ w(0,nH,τk) =
w∗ in long-run equilibrium. Moreover, as the probability of a high-ability entrepreneur to obtain
low ability is 1−pH, the number of exiting ﬁrms is (1−pH)nH. Second, suppose ∆ > ˆ ∆, which
is equivalent to
g(aL,w∗,τk) + ∆(1 − δ)˜ k(aH,w∗,τk) > w∗ + B(τb). (25)
In this case, low-ability descendants of entrepreneurs remain in the market if their parent had
high ability. According to assumption A1, they exit if their parent had low ability. Thus,
pLnL ﬁrms exit, as pL is the share of low-ability entrepreneurs with low-ability oﬀspring. On
the other hand the probability that a high-ability entrepreneur has a low ability oﬀspring who
continues the family business is 1 − pH. This implies nL = (1 − pH)nH which together with
˜ w(nL,nH,τk) = w∗ implicitly deﬁnes the number of high-ability entrepreneurs in equilibrium.

Proof of Corollary 1. First, note that limw→w g(a,w,τk) → ∞. As g(a,w,τk) is strictly
decreasing in w and the right-hand side of (15) is strictly increasing in w without bound, there
exists a unique w∗ > 0 as given by (16). One can also show that limw→w ˜ l(a,w,τk) → ∞ and
limw→∞ ˜ l(a,w,τk) = 0. Using (17), this implies that both ˜ w(0,n,τk) and ˜ w((1 − λ)n,n,τk) are
increasing as function of n without bound. Observing Proposition 1 conﬁrms the result. 
Proof of Corollary 2. Introducing preferential tax treatment of continued businesses (τk <
τs) by raising τs implies that the continuation value per unit of capital, ∆, rises whereas threshold
value ˆ ∆ remains unchanged, according to (18). Applying Proposition 1 conﬁrms the result. 
Proof of Proposition 2. For the Type 1 equilibrium, (19) follows from (17) and nL = 0
(recall part (i) of Proposition 1), where w∗ is given by (16). In Type 2 equilibrium, (17)
and nL = (1 − pH)nH (recall part (ii) of Proposition 1) imply (1 − pH)nH
h





˜ l(aH,w,τk) + 1
i
= 1, which leads to (20). From (19) and (20) we ﬁnd ˆ nH1 > ˆ nH2. Moreover,
in type 2 equilibrium, where nL = (1−pH)ˆ nH2, the total number of ﬁrms is given by (2−pH)ˆ nH2.
It is easy to show that (2 − pH)ˆ nH2 > ˆ nH1 if and only if ˜ l(aH,w∗,τk) > ˜ l(aL,w∗,τk), which
holds according to (10b). This concludes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Denote utility of a high-ability heir of a high-ability entrepreneur
(staying in the market in both types of equilibria) by u
high−high
stay and utility of workers (which in
equilibrium equals utility of high-ability heirs of workers who become entrepreneurs) by uenter.
Moreover, recall that B is the net utility received from making a bequest as a worker (v(bnet)−b),
and g(a,w,τk) is the sum of the proﬁt of an entrepreneur with ability a and net utility from
34passing on the ﬁrm (v(bnet) − k). Taking into account the amount of bequests received as well
as transfers, in view of utility function (1), we ﬁnd that in a steady state
u
high−high
stay = g(aH,w∗,τk) + (1 − τk)(1 − δ)˜ k(aH,w∗,τk) + T, (26)
uenter = w∗ + (1 − τb)¯ b(τb) + B(τb) + T. (27)
Those low-ability descendants of an entrepreneur with ability a ∈ {aL,aH} who exit the market
derive utility
uexit(a) = w∗ + (q − τs)(1 − δ)˜ k(a,w∗,τk) + B(τb) + T. (28)
Denote the aggregate welfare level,
R 1
0 U(i)di, in Type 1 and Type 2 equilibrium by W1 and W2,
respectively. We start by deriving W1. In Type 1 equilibrium, there are pHˆ nH1 and (1−pH)ˆ nH1
high-ability and low-ability descendants of (high-ability) entrepreneurs, respectively. Thus,
W1 = pHˆ nH1u
high−high
stay + (1 − pH)ˆ nH1uexit(aH) + (1 − ˆ nH1)uenter. (29)
Substituting expressions (26)-(28) into (29), observing that tax revenue (per capita) equals
transfer T, using from (16) that g(aH,w∗,τk) = w∗ +B(τb)+ ¯ k, and rearranging terms gives us
W1 = w∗ + B(τb) + pHˆ nH1¯ k + (1 − ˆ nH1)¯ b(τb) +
(1 − δ)˜ k(aH,w∗,τk)

pH + q(1 − pH)

ˆ nH1. (30)
In Type 2 equilibrium, there are pHˆ nH2 and (1−pH)ˆ nH2 high-ability and low-ability descendants
of high-ability entrepreneurs, respectively. Both groups stay in the market. Their respective
utility levels are u
high−high
stay as given in (26) and
u
high−low
stay = g(aL,w∗,τk) + (1 − τk)(1 − δ)˜ k(aH,w∗,τk) + T. (31)
Moreover, there are pLnL and (1 − pL)nL low-ability and high-ability individuals who inherit




stay = g(aH,w∗,τk) + (1 − τk)(1 − δ)˜ k(aL,w∗,τk) + T. (32)
Noting that nL = (1 − pH)nH in steady state, we ﬁnd that
W2 = pHˆ nH2u
high−high
stay + (1 − pH)ˆ nH2u
high−low
stay + pL(1 − pH)ˆ nH2uexit(aL) +




1 − (2 − pH)ˆ nH2
uenter. (33)
Analogously to the derivation of (30), this can be rewritten as
W2 = (1 − (1 − pH)ˆ nH2)[w∗ + B(τb)] + (1 − δ)˜ k(aH,w∗,τk)ˆ nH2 +
(1 − δ)˜ k(aL,w∗,τk)(1 − pH)(1 − pL + qpL)ˆ nH2 + (1 − pH)ˆ nH2g(aL,w∗,τk) +

pH + (1 − pL)(1 − pH)

ˆ nH2¯ k +

1 − (2 − pH)ˆ nH2¯ b(τb). (34)
Note that neither W1 nor W2 depends on τs, which conﬁrms the ﬁrst part of Proposition 3.
To decide in which type of equilibrium welfare is higher (for given tax rates), use (30) and (34)
to ﬁnd that W1 < W2 if and only if
(1 − pH)ˆ nH2 




(2 − pH)ˆ nH2 − ˆ nH1¯ b(τb) +
35(1 − pH)(1 − δ)
h
ˆ nH1˜ k(aH,w∗,τk) − pLˆ nH2˜ k(aL,w∗,τk)
i
q
< (ˆ nH2 − pHˆ nH1)(1 − δ)˜ k(aH,w∗,τk) + (1 − pH)(1 − pL)(1 − δ)˜ k(aL,w∗,τk) +

ˆ nH2 − pHˆ nH1 + pL(1 − pH)ˆ nH2¯ k. (35)
Note from assumption (A1) that w∗+B(τb) > g(aL,w∗,τk). Moreover, according to Proposition
2, we have ˆ nH1 > ˆ nH2 and (2−pH)ˆ nH2 > ˆ nH1. Thus, all terms on left-hand side of the inequality
all positive. Proposition 2 also implies ˆ nH2 > pHˆ nH1; thus, all terms on the right-hand side are
positive as well. If q rises, the left-hand side is increasing and the right-hand side is unaﬀected.
The opposite holds if ¯ k rises. This concludes the proof. 
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